THE life history of Alfred Diban, the father of the noted Burkinabe historian and politician Joseph Ki-Zerbo, is remarkable and compelling, not least for its theme of perseverance through formidable hardships.1 Born in the second half of the nineteenth century in a corner of what is now western Burkina Faso -hereafter referred to as Souroudougou -Diban paints a vivid portrait of a complex and highly competitive social landscape dominated by ubiquitous warfare and raiding between and within village communities in the region. In this climate of instability and insecurity, Diban was captured and made a slave during the late nineteenth century, while still a young man. Passing into the slave-trading network of the Middle Niger delta, he ended up a household slave of a Fulani herder somewhere to the north of Timbuktu. Chafing under the cruelty of his master, he on numerous occasions attempted daring escapes, however unsuccessfully.
Finally able to evade captivity, Alfred Diban chanced into the orbit of French Catholic missionaries (Les Peres Blancs, 'The White Fathers') and became a trusted servant in the Segu mission. When missionary activity was extended into the region of what is now Burkina Faso (then still part of the colony of Haut-Senegal-Niger), Diban was chosen to relocate to the new mission of Toma in southern Souroudougou, returning to his natal region in a triumphant manner. Alfred Diban would gain prestige and recognition for his efforts on behalf of the Christian community in Upper Volta, becoming an acquaintance and confidant of many top government and church officials. * I wish to thank Martin Klein, Richard Roberts and the editors of this journal for their comments on this article, and Mark Waggoner for assistance in producing the map. Funding for this project was provided by the Fulbright-Hays program for dissertation Thus, while providing an effective conceptual vehicle for examining the dynamic role of centralized slave-acquiring societies in the precolonial western Sudan, the predatory state model is nevertheless unsatisfactory in achieving a comprehensive understanding of regional political economies, particularly the participation of decentralized societies in regional slavetrading systems. In this model, 'peripheral' regions and populations, those located in the interstices or zones of predation circumscribing warrior states, figure only as reservoirs of slaves to be tapped by predatory states.7 This neglect may be explained for several reasons. Firstly, the study of the history of decentralized societies in Africa has suffered generally from a bias in favor of states and empires. States not only accumulate more evidence for the scholar to sift, but are also often considered of greater intrinsic significance within the scope of broad processes of change than social groupings of smaller scale and more elusive historical pedigree.8 Secondly, historians have often uncritically accepted the notion that states involved in the slave trade of West Africa dominated the process of accumulating slaves, for internal use or trade, at the expense of 'defenseless' neighboring decentralized populations.9
Studies of the slave trade in the western Sudan and West Africa more broadly, have often overlooked or dismissed decentralized societies as passive recipients or 'victims' of predatory action rather than as dynamic participants in regional political economies. A rethinking of conceptual approaches to the study of the slave trade is needed, expanding the conceptual menu beyond the predatory state model to fashion truly regional perspectives on the development and impact of the slave trade. By broadening our conceptual parameters to include a more rigourous examination of the role of 'reservoir' areas, Africanists will gain a more nuanced perspective of the complexity of the interior slave trade in West Africa and the variety of mechanisms that ultimately linked sources of African slaves to the transatlantic and trans-Saharan slave trades.10 Using examples drawn from the case study of Souroudougou during the nineteenth century, this article will argue that a range of mechanisms and strategies were operating to ensure a steady flow of captives from the region to neighboring states and into the wider commercial networks of the Niger bend. During the nineteenth century, Souroudougou was a region populated by village-sized social units, many of which in the past had been loosely grouped together into a number of religious and ancestrally-linked village confederations. Although highly fragmented into autonomous and antagonistic villages by the time of the French conquest during the I89os, French officials misperceived this fractious social landscape through the distorting lense of the doctrine of 'politique des races' and applied a tribal label to the regional inhabitants: the 'Samo'. 1 As part of the densely populated western Volta savanna belt and located in close proximity to major slave markets along the Niger river bend, the village communities of Souroudougou were prized as slave 'reservoirs' for neighboring states during and most likely before the nineteenth century.
Several conditions, however, obtaining simultaneously, limited the ability of neighboring states to dominate the extraction of slaves from the region while ensuring that a constant flow of captives did supply external demand.12 This article will employ two conceptual tools to describe the operation of this regional system: 'indirect linkages' and the ' espace de competition' (terrain of competition). The notion of 'indirect linkages' refers to the variety of mechanisms that emerged to funnel captives from Souroudougou to slave markets situated along its periphery. In the unstable environment of the western Sudan during the nineteenth century, the inhabitants of 'reservoirs' such as Souroudougou, far from lying defenseless before the raiding activities of military states, deployed a host of effective defensive strategies to minimize the impact of predation. These included farming in groups, or living within closely-packed communities protected by imposing exterior walls. Faced with the difficulty of penetrating imposing village fortifications and overwhelming skilled defenders directly to control these sources of slaves, neighboring states sought to establish alternative linkages in Souroudougou by cultivating local allies and agents who could ensure a steady flow of captives to the outside. Commercial networks dominated by Muslim Andrew Hubbell, 'Patronage and predation: A social history of colonial chieftaincies in a chiefless region -Souroudougou (Burkina Faso), I850-1946 "1 A detailed discussion of 'tribalization' in colonial Souroudougou can be found in Hubbell, 'Patronage and predation', ch. i. 12 The terms 'captives' and 'slaves' describe different phases in the process of enslavement. 'Captives' refers to those recently captured and in the process of being transported to markets to be sold as slaves, although this distinction admittedly becomes vague at the point where a captive was sold to a passing merchant to be transported to a slave market. However, very few captives were kept by their captors as slaves within Souroudougou, so it is important to distinguish between this initial state of captivity and the eventual condition of slavery. The progression along this continuum is conveyed by Alfred Diban's narrative. See Ki-Zerbo, Alfred Diban. traders such as the Juula and the Yarse also played an important role in funnelling captives from village communities in Souroudougou to nearby slave markets.13
Facilitating the flow of captives to external markets was a pervasive condition of competition between groups and individuals which existed at the local level, an important historical dynamic shaping the precolonial social landscape of Souroudougou.14 Here, the concept of the espace de competition as defined by Jean Bazin and Emmanuel Terray is helpful.15 Bazin and Terray liken a decentralized society to a terrain of competition in which warfare, raiding and feuding are the expression of an underlying competitive tension between lineages and individuals over access to the scarce resources needed for their reproduction and growth (demographic proliferation). The nature and intensity of this competition could fluctuate over time, given internal conditions and external influences. While Bazin and Terray focus closely on the centrality of conflict over access to and control of women in such a political economy, competition over other scarce or valuable resources becomes equally important in particular contexts. In the case of Souroudougou during the late nineteenth century, a growing regional demand for slaves and the profit to be made from supplying this demand, encouraged an increasing pattern of localized warfare and indiscriminate captive-taking. In the area of Tougan in central Souroudougou, this form of captive-taking was called 'tampio' (banditry). 16 The nature of tampio reflected, at a deeper level, a fundamental transformation in the parameters of the espace de competition within the social landscape of Souroudougou. Bonds between villages and established codes of conduct concerning warfare and the capture of individuals were eroding under the stress of the growing demand for slaves to satisfy nearby markets in the Niger river valley. Famines caused by drought and the insecurity of farming beyond the protective walls of villages contributed to this shift in patterns of competition, interjecting the corrosive influence of the slave trade into intra-village and family life.
The confluence of a changing espace de compdtition in Souroudougou and 13 Robin Law notes that state-sponsored raiding and commercial mechanisms for obtaining slaves could be 'incompatible alternatives'. See Law, 'Slave-raiders and middlemen', 45-6. The case of Souroudougou appears to support this assessment.
14 While earlier studies of decentralized societies in Africa tend to stress the mechanisms of mediation and affiliation that served to dissipate competitive tensions between groups and individuals, more recent and historically-inclined work has shifted the focus to the nature and expression of competitive tensions as a defining characteristic of such social entities. A classic example from the earlier school is Meyer Fortes' study of Tallensi Other resources controlled by male notables were captives and slaves. Again, Heritier informs us that traditionally only the lamutiri and in some cases the tandana, possessed the right to hold slaves, but only if they had been acquired 'properly'.50 These individuals were entitled to employ a small number of slaves as domestic servants or field laborers, or they could sell them to other lineages or to passing merchants to provide an income meant to subvent their ritual duties. However, other informants indicated that this monopoly on the labor and market value of captives was not solely the domain of the lamutiri or tandana, but included other village notables (elder lineage heads) as well. Tiegna Yaro of Gomboro stated that 'captives would be given to the chief as his personal slaves, while the rest were sold to merchants. The cowries received in exchange for the captives would then be divided among the notables of Gomboro In the idealized portrait woven by oral traditions, competition over access to valuable resources was circumscribed, limited essentially to conflict between rival villages and federations.52 The hegemony of elite male elders was buttressed by their ability to monopolize how such resources were acquired and disposed of. Evidence dating from the late nineteenth century, however, suggests that important transformations were occurring within the social landscape of Souroudougou. By this time, Souroudougou had become a more fluid, complexly divided, social landscape composed of increasingly autonomous village communities situated in an increasingly precarious environment. Alfred Diban's vivid remembrances of late nineteenth-century Souroudougou recalled in the introduction indicate that Souroudougou during this period had become a vast, roiling theater of conflict and competition, with quarrels, skirmishes and warfare occurring between and within villages.
Echenberg supports this depiction, noting that by the nineteenth century it had become dangerous for the inhabitants of Souroudougou to visit their ancestral shrines located in d6dana centers. This weakened the important religious/ritual bonds that gave form to many of these federations. Instead, ritual functions were increasingly performed individually within each community.53 Another indication of the fragmentation of large federations during this period was the trend towards alliances between much smaller groups of villages, usually no more than two or three. These smaller-scale groupings were often formed to ensure defensive aid and preparedness in the event of attack, representing an adaptation to an increasingly hostile and precarious environment.54
This fragmentation of social cohesion at a macro-level of society, the village confederation, reflected deeper transformations in the nature of competition within the region. As the regional demand for slaves increased, there was greater motivation for individuals to circumvent established codes of conduct pertaining to the capture and enslavement of others. Heritier notes that the 'illegal' seizure and sale of persons (banditry) was increasingly practiced by groups of young men ('commandos') during this period of flux in the slave trade.55 These were precisely the individuals who were most adversely impacted by the traditional mode, or ethics, of competition, being excluded from the circle of elder male beneficiaries who controlled the most important sources of wealth and status. In essence, a reciprocal process appears to have been at work within the social institutions shaping the social landscape of Souroudougou. On the one hand, linkages between villagesfor example, between a satellite community and a d6dana village -were becoming more tenuous as banditry increased. At the same time, the fraying cohesion of broad-based village organizations probably encouraged banditry because moral and ethical standards that had constituted an important part 
